National Transportation Safety Board
Highway Accident Report

Report No.: NTSB-RHR-75-1
Report Date: July 7, 1975

National Technical Information Service
Report PB244467/AS

Collision of a Southern Railway Work Train with a Polk District School bus at Aragon, Ga., Oct. 23, 1974.

Synopsis

At about 7:55 a.m., e.d.t., October 23, 1974, a Polk School District school bus carrying 87 students, traveling east over an unprotected Southern Railway grade crossing on Bellview Road in Aragon, Ga., was struck by a Southern Railway work train which was being shoved rearward to the south over the crossing. Both vehicles were moving slowly.

The school bus, operated by a school district employee, was driven without stopping at the grade crossing and into the path of the southbound train. The caboose was the lead car as the train approached the grade crossing and the locomotive shoving the train was nine cars to the north. The train flagman aboard the caboose did not guard the crossing. The bus was hit in the middle left side by the caboose, and was pushed 315 feet down the track by the train before both vehicles stopped. The bus was rolled during the crash sequence onto its roof and was over-ridden by the caboose.

Seven students died as a result of the collision; the busdriver and 71 the students were injured. No one was ejected from the bus. No one on the train was injured.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the school bus driver to stop his vehicle short of the track and wait until it was safe to proceed, and the failure of the flagman of the train to guard the unprotected crossing.

Conclusions

1. The driver of the school bus was not physically incapacitated prior to the collision.

2. There is no evidence that the mechanical condition either of the school bus or the train contributed to the accident.

3. The driver of the school bus, had he been looking, and the flagman, had he been on the rear platform of the caboose, had an unobstructed view between the vehicles when they were within a safe stopping distance from their respective edges of the crossing.

4. The driver of the school bus and the flagman on the caboose understood their respective responsibilities for the safe movement over the grade crossing. Neither the driver nor the flagman complied with those responsibilities.

5. The requirement for school buses to stop short of the railroad track(s) at a grade crossing in more than a legislated formality. It provides the time necessary to detect potential hazards and thereby insures safe passage. School bus drivers need to be made aware of the necessity of stopping at all rail-highway grade crossings.

6. It was essential to the safe operation of the train during its rearward movement that the actions of the traincrew be monitored, and if necessary questioned, by the road foreman of engines. The road foreman took no exception to the manner in which any member of the crew was performing his duties.

7. The number of students on the bus, which was in excess of the State of Georgia's and the manufacturer's rated passenger-capacities of the vehicle, did not contribute to the accident.

8. Had the caboose been equipped with a radio jack at the south end or the flagman provided with a portable radio, the flagman could have remained on the leading platform during the entire movement. The use of hand signals by the flagman to direct the movement of the train would have permitted him to stay on the leading end of the caboose during the entire movement.

9. If the flagman had elected to communicate with the engineer by hand signals, the engineer would have been able to see his signals.

10. The failure of the flagman to notify the engineer of the collision and/or apply the airbrake valve available to him in the caboose allowed the train to push the school bus over 300 feet from the point of impact before stopping. That movement contributed to the severity of injuries and loss of life.

11. Formal guidelines had not been promulgated to assist traincrews in the selection of the use of radio or had signals to direct the movement of trains.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the school bus driver to stop his vehicle short of the track until it was safe to proceed, and the failure of the flagman of the train to guard the unprotected crossing.

Recommendations

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that:

1. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) promulgate regulations governing railroad operating rules for the use of radio communications and flagging when trains are being pushed (shoved) across grade crossings. (Recommendation R-75-31)

2. The FRA promulgate regulations to require that if radios are to be utilized for directing rearward movement of trains, the radios must be installed so that they can be used by an employee from the leading platform. (Recommendation R-75-32)

3. The Polk School District, State of Georgia, establish a formal procedure for frequent field checks of school bus drivers to insure their compliance with the District's safety policies and Georgia's Uniform Rule of the Roads.