National Transportation Safety Board
Highway Accident Report

Report No.: NTSB/RHR-85/01
Report Date: June 12, 1985

Grade Crossing Collision of a Florida East Coast Railway Company Freight Train
and an Indian River Academy School Bus Port St. Lucie, Fla., Sept. 27, 1984

Abstract

About 6:55 a.m., on Sept. 27, 1984, a northbound Florida East Coast Railway Company freight train struck a westbound Indian River Academy school bus stalled at a grade crossing on Walton Road in Port St. Lucie, Florida. The grade crossing was a two-lane, asphalt-paved, county road intersecting a single railroad track with automatic flashing signals and gates. The 1968 Bluebird/Chevrolet 66-passenger school bus was occupied by the driver and four students. Two of the students fled the stopped school bus before impact and were not injured. In the collision, the school bus body separated from the chassis, and the three remaining occupants were ejected. The two students were killed and the busdriver was injured seriously. Neither of the two train crewmembers were injured.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inadequate standard for certifying nonpublic school bus drivers, insufficient training and testing programs, and the limited experience of the school bus driver, which led to the intrusion of the school bus onto the railroad track when the driver mis-shifted the transmission. Contributing to the accident was the absence of a stop line on the westbound approach to the grade crossing. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the engineer's delay in applying the train brakes and the locked deadbolt on the rear emergency door of the school bus.

CONTENTS

SYNOPSIS

INVESTIGATION The Accident 1 Injuries to Persons 3 School bus Information and Damage 3 Train Information and Damage 9 Roadway Information 10 Track Information 12 Personnel Information 12 Method of Operation 14 Meteorological Information 16 Medical and Pathological Information 16 Survival Aspects 16 Tests and Research 16 Other Information 18 Pupil Transportation Safety in Florida 18 Operation Lifesaver 19

ANALYSIS 20 The Accident 20 Operation of the Train 22 School bus Driver Training 23 Nonpublic School Pupil Transportation 25 Survival Aspects 26 Operation Lifesaver 27

CONCLUSIONS 27 Findings 27 Probable Cause 28

RECOMMENDATIONS 29

APPENDIXES Appendix A - Investigation 31 Appendix B - Applicable Laws, Rules, Regulations, and Standards 32 Appendix C - School bus Data 38 Appendix D - Tests and Research 40 Appendix E - Proposed 1984 Florida Legislation 43 Appendix F - State Survey Results Concerning Locks on School bus Emergency Doors 50

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inadequate standards for certifying nonpublic school bus drivers, insufficient training and testing programs, and the limited experience of the school bus driver, which led to the intrusion of the school bus onto the railroad track when the driver mis-shifted the transmission. Contributing to the accident was the absence of a stop line on the westbound approach to the grade crossing. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the engineer's delay in applying the train brakes and the locked deadbolt on the rear emergency door of the school bus.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board made the following recommendations:

-- to the Florida East Coast Railway Company:

Use the results of the investigation of the accident in Port St. Lucie, Fla. on Sept. 27, 1984, as a part of the railroad/highway grade crossing safety training given to engine crews. (Class II, Priority Action)(R-85-74)

-- to the National Safety Council:

Encourage Operation Lifesaver Councils in each State to identify nonpublic school which transport students to and from schools, and include these schools in their programs.

-- to the State of Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia:

Prohibit the operation of nonpublic school buses while deadbolt or similar supplemental locks on emergency doors are engaged. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-85-17)

-- to the States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming:

Prohibit the operation of public and nonpublic school buses while deadbolt or similar supplemental locks on emergency doors and engaged. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-85-18)

In addition to these recommendations, the Safety Board reiterates the following Safety Recommendations issued to the State of Florida and other states:

H-79-31: Enact legislation to require that the driver of any motor vehicle with a seating capacity of more than 16 passengers, whether so employed or acting voluntarily, shall possess, in addition to a properly classified State drivers license, a certificate authenticating such driver's successful completion of a bus driver training course which conforms to the NHTSA Highway Safety Program Standard No. 17, "Pupil Transportation Safety." (Issued May 15, 1979)

H-84-72: Enact appropriate legislation to require all prospective operators of noncommercial buses to demonstrate their driving skills by taking an appropriate written examination and road test in the size vehicle for which the license is to be issued. (Issued Sept. 24, 1984)

H-85-12: Develop a model instructional program to be used by local school districts targeted at drivers of privately-owned and privately-operated pupil transportation vehicles that includes a review of all applicable first-aid and pretrip inspections, and encourage drivers of privately-owned and privately-operated pupil transportation vehicles to participate in the program. (Issued June 4, 1985)