National Transportation Safety Board
Highway Accident Report

Accident Report: PB93-916202
NTSB/HAR-93/02

Charter bus loss of control, overturn and fire near Vernon, New Jersey, July 26, 1992

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

   On Sunday, July 26, 1992, about 11:10 a.m., the driver of a charter bus traveling from Brooklyn, New York, to Vernon, New Jersey, lost control of the bus as it descended a steep hill. The bus struck a car, overturned on its right side, slid and spun on its side, uprighted, and struck another car before coming to rest. A fire ensued, burning the bus and the second car. Twelve passengers were ejected from the bus during the collision; six of them died. The driver and the other 37 bus passengers sustained minor to serious injuries. The two car drivers sustained minor injuries, and the car passenger was uninjured.

The safety issues addressed in this report include the following:

* the deteriorated braking efficiency of the accident bus;

* the busdriver's initial gear selection in descending County Route

* (CR) 515 and his subsequent attempt to downshift during the descent;

* the adequacy of State and Federal oversight of motor carrier operations;

* the adequacy of highway signing to prepare drivers for descending CR 515;

* the adequacy of New York State commercial vehicle inspections and safety/compliance reviews.

As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board issued safety recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration, the New York Department of Motor Vehicles, the New York Department of Transportation, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, the United Bus Owners of America, and the American Bus Association.

CONCLUSIONS

Findings 1. Neither the weather nor the pavement contributed to the accident. The busdriver was not impaired by fatigue, alcohol, or other drugs.

2. The bus had not been adequately maintained and was not fit for service.

3. The busdriver began descending the hill in third or fourth gear.

4. The bus was going too fast for the driver to be able to shift into second gear and when he tried to, he instead shifted into neutral; with the bus in neutral, the engine and transmission were unable to help retard the speed of the bus.

5. The bus was traveling about 60 mph when it struck the first car.

6. The busdriver knew or should have known that he had to downshift to second gear before descending the hill; however, he failed to do so.

7. Because its brakes were extremely deficient, the accident bus could not have negotiated the hill in third gear.

8. The busdriver knew about the deficient condition of the brakes and the bus and chose to operate the bus without first repairing the brakes and other known major deficiencies.

9. Although the State of New York had sufficient indications that Golden Sons was not in compliance with State and Federal safety requirements, it did not inspect or review the carrier's operations and vehicles.

10. Issuing registration plates to a bus upon certification that it will be inspected within 10 days does not adequately deter operators of uninspected and unsafe buses.

11. The New York Department of Transportation does not adequately ensure that buses subject to its jurisdiction are inspected.

12. The Federal Highway Administration's system for identifying carriers is inadequate.

13. Although the signs in place at the time of the accident warned the busdriver, they did not accurately reflect the characteristics of the roadway and were not in compliance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices requirements.

14. Current data on intercity bus ejections do not adequately reflect the number of injuries and deaths caused by ejections.

15. The risk of fire would have been substantially reduced had the bus had a fuel cap.

PROBABLE CAUSE

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the busdriver/owner's failure to maintain the bus adequately and his deliberate disregard in choosing to operate the bus with known brake deficiencies. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the New York Department of Transportation to inspect the bus and ensure that its deficiencies were corrected. Also contributing to the accident was the inadequacy of the Federal Highway Administration's system for identifying motor carriers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

--to the Federal Highway Administration:

Require any carrier that changes its name or principal place-of-business address to update its MCS-150 promptly. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-93-27)

Develop a systematic and continual process of identification of carriers subject to the Federal Highway Administration's jurisdiction that includes the immediate entry of new carriers onto the Motor Carrier Management Information System, systematically accessing available State record systems, and maintaining contact with the Interstate Commerce Commission concerning new motor carriers. Devise a method of verifying that the process results in the identification of the entire carrier population. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-93-28)

--to the New York Department of Motor Vehicles:

Issue registration plates for commercial vehicles capable of transporting passengers only after the vehicle has passed an inspection.(Class II, Priority Action) (H-93-29)

--to the New York Department of Transportation:

Conduct periodic roadside inspections to identify buses that are not fit for service and prohibit them from operating, regardless of whether passengers are on board, until they have passed inspection. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-93-30)

--to the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators:

Ascertain which States do not require mechanical inspections of vehicles capable of transporting passengers before issuing registration plates and then, recommend that those States issue registration plates for these vehicles only after the vehicle has passed an inspection. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-93-31)

--to the United Bus Owners of America:

Advise members of the circumstances of this accident and urge them to report any suspected safety violations or uninspected buses to the appropriate authorities. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-93-32)

--to the American Bus Association:

Advise members of the circumstances of this accident and urge them to report any suspected safety violations or uninspected buses to the appropriate authorities. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-93-33)